by Paul R. Spitzzeri
As prior posts here have covered, severe flooding in the winter of 1913-1914, following many such events over previous decades led to the formation of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District, with its Chief Engineer James W. Reagan overseeing initial plans for dikes, dams, adjustments to watercourses and protection to roads, private property and the Port of Los Angeles.
These aims, as expressed in a 1917 report, were modest compared to later initiatives, which included voter approval in 1924 for $35 million in bonds and involved major dams in the San Gabriel Mountains, with the largest in the world in San Gabriel Canyon. Work was undertaken, but not without some significant controversy and construction issues, as well as questions about Reagan’s leadership.
One of the projects, in Big Dalton Canyon, northeast of the San Gabriel Valley town of Glendora, is the topic for this post with an article “Design and Construction of Big Dalton Multiple-Arch Dam” in the 26 December 1929 edition of Engineering News-Record being the highlighted object from the Museum’s collection. The author was Eugene C. Eaton (1881-1967), no related to Fred Eaton of Los Angeles water history renown and son of Benjamin Eaton, namesake of the canyon to the west of Big Dalton.
Eaton was born in Providence, Rhode Island and earned a degree from McGill University in Montreal, upon which he became a construction engineer and specialized in water projects. He was responsible for dam building for the State of California from 1921 to 1927 before being hired by the county after Reagan’s resignation as chief engineer of the flood control district. Later, he was a state irrigation engineer and worked on water right issues for the Central Valley Project.
With the passage of the 1924 bond issue, work on a dam at Big Dalton commenced, but issues arose almost immediately. The 8 January 1925 edition of the Pasadena Post reported that Reagan was contemplating a change from a multiple-arch to a gravity dam and that this would increase costs by up to $300,000. Moreover, it was stated that location of a site was underway and that “bed rock has been found at comparatively shallow depths,” while work continued so that “the dam may be built on the best possible foundation.”
Construction commenced at what was to be a project costing around $550,000 and, when heavy rains and flooding came in early 1927 and Reagan told the media that damage was limited and that flood control work had come a long way since 1914, it was noted in the Los Angeles Times of 20 February that the Big Dalton, at 50 feet of construction to date, and, “after the capacity of the diverting tunnel had been exhausted,” water breached the top but without damage. It was concluded that “this dam in its uncompleted condition was an important controlling factor of the flood in the Big Dalton.”
The following month, after talk of a name change to Glendora Canyon Dam was broached, but not acted upon, the Hollywood Citizen of 22 March cited an engineering study, critical of much of the flood control district’s work under Reagan, that was quoted as suggesting that “for flood control the big Dalton [sic] dam is of no value . . . Without a larger spillway than is now contemplated, this dam is considered to be positively unsafe.” As noted above, he soon resigned and was replaced by Eaton.
The 12 August issue of the Covina Argus reprinted an editorial from the neighboring Baldwin Park Progress, in which “The Dam Situation” was examined during the Reagan era and it was remarked “right here at our own door a miscalculation in the construction of the Big Dalton dam has rendered $100,000 of work worthless” among multifold problems in the county system of flood control.
The Argus of 9 September reviewed projects under the aegis of the district and it observed that “a multiple arch concrete dam has been authorized by the board of supervisors” and added that “this dam is to supersede one partially constructed by a former chief flood control engineer [Reagan], and which was disapproved by the state engineering department and the Los Angeles county consulting board.”
The paper ended by remarking that the new eight-arch edifice was to be 165 feet high from the foundation and 140 from the streambed, 500 feet across and 200 feet thick at the base and that “this dam will protect the Glendora, upper Covina, Irwindale and Baldwin Park territories, and will add 700 acre feet of conservation to the Glendora water supply.”
Work began in mid-November after a contract, at the start of the month, was issued to H.W. Rohl Company of San Francisco, then undertaking the construction of the nearby Puddingstone dam and reservoir and which outbid seven other firms at not too far north of $380,000. It was added by the Argus of 4 November that “the dam will be built at a site 400 feet up the canyon from the site of [a] rock fill dam now in place” and mentioned above as condemned.
The Times of 14 November reported that official work was to start with a groundbreaking three days later with a lunch following by the ceremonial turning of the earth for what was pegged to cost $600,000. It was added, though, that “it will be impossible to do any great amount of work . . . until after the winter rains are over,” but that some men would be at work on the project, which expected to be completed within a year.
Incidentally, it was also noted that participants at the ceremony were also to inspect completed portions of the Glendora Mountain Road, which was projected to terminate at the newly opened Big Pines Camp near Wrightwood—though it only got as far as San Antonio Canyon and Mt. Baldy Village. In the Argus of the 25th, Eaton was cited as stating that “the dam is to be three times as strong as any dam of its type in the world.”
The 9 December edition of the paper featured a full-page ad by Rohl, titled “Great Opportunities” and which was addressed “To the People of the San Gabriel Valley,” thanking them “for their splendid cooperation and for the friendly spirit” shown to the firm,” while also praising the Board of Supervisors, Eaton and the flood control district.” It added that it intended to rush the Big Dalton Dam to completion “with intelligent care, in order that the best interests of the people be served.”
Work apparently moved along smoothly enough given the limitations of the winter rainy season, but the situation changed dramatically after the terrible tragedy of the collapse of the St. Francis Dam near modern Santa Clarita on 12-13 March 1928. The Argus of the 23rd ran an editorial in which it asserted that “people must not get frightened because one dam went out went out and resulted in a huge loss of life and property.” It offered that, when it came to the Big Dalton and San Gabriel Canyon dams, “more caution must be used in their construction.”
Eaton discussed the matter with the Glendora Chamber of Commerce secretary and told him that “every precaution is being and will continue to be taken . . . to make the Big Dalton dam an absolutely safe and dependable structure.” He reviewed the construction elements, emphasizing the strength involved, and averred that “there is nothing experimental” about its design which was deemed “more conservative” because of less stress to the concrete and pressure to the foundation than the other types, of which there were more than thirty in the country.
The 4 April issue of the Los Angeles Express reported, however, that the Board of Supervisors ordered all work on dam projects to cease until foundation tests could be conducted and reported, with Rohl told to work on these for Big Dalton to determine if the rock formations were substantial enough to proceed on construction.
It was added that the multiple-arch design would not necessitate a solid rock foundation, but the St. Francis disaster led to the view that “it [was] wise not to take any undue chances.” Moreover, the paper noted that there had not been such as expenditure of funds that the Big Dalton project could be abandoned if necessary.
The following day’s Times featured an editorial on “An Expensive Dam,” which noted the more than doubling of the original estimate and said that, given the amount of water impounded, the expenditure “seems unduly large,” while “if it serves to prevent a single disastrous flood, the cost will be repaid.” Given the changing history of Big Dalton, the paper opined that
Flood-control dams, in general, are a permanent contribution to stability and, in so far as they also serve to conserve rainfall, to prosperity. The Big Dalton Dam, it is hoped, will be giving good service in both capacities long after its cost is forgotten.
The Los Angeles Record, long concerned about massive public works project and political corruption tied to them, demonstrated much concern about the necessity for the project, reporting on 9 April that the supervisors were looking at issues of stability and strength for the dam. Supervisor Sidney T. Graves, told the paper “we are in a mess. I am ready to take my share of the blame” because there were insufficient studies done at Big Dalton and Pacoima, the latter in the eastern San Fernando Valley.
Moreover, the board decided to have a committee of consulting engineers take over the management of these projects from Eaton, who insisted that a solid rock foundation was not required, and, ironically, one of them was Reagan, while official work at Big Dalton was halted on the first of the month. Addressing the mounting costs, Graves wanted it made clear that it was understood that any funds above $670,000 was to come out of the county’s maintenance fund, but “before we go any farther I want to know whether it was safe” to continue.
Three days later, under the heading of “Exit, Mulholland and Reagan!,” the Record demanded that, in the wake of the St. Francis disaster and the Reagan tenure, “we shall say good-bye forever to such ‘engineers’ as William Mulholland and J.W. Reagan.” It accounted both men politicians more than engineers, though each was acknowledged to have “their one-time virtue or ability, within certain limits.”
While Mulholland was recognized for his “picturesqueness” and his “daring and a certain efficiency in organization,” not to mention using labor “ruthlessly,” Reagan was deemed to be a manipulator of his contacts within county government and a facilitator of “ranch and realty interests. Additionally, he was considered “of a lower order” than Mulholland because of “his timidity which forced him at times to the pretense of listening to men who knew” more about engineering.
The essential problem, pronounced the Record was that “neither man entertained respect for the science of geology” and so, as Mulholland failed with the St. Francis Dam, it was asserted that Reagan was likely to do the same thing with Pacoima and Big Dalton, “both of which were conceived in black ignorance and dishonest politics.” The lesson, the editorial ended, was that:
We have passed the age of cow country heroes. It is time for us to seek out real engineers. The ablest and best-trained are none too good for us.
The Record continued its critical coverage, reporting on 19 April that the district consulting engineers committee was, through its investigation of all county dam projects, basically conducting a “probe.” Moreover, it repeated rumor from county headquarters in the Hall of Records in downtown Los Angeles that “this [Big Dalton] dam will be branded ‘uneconomic’ because of its small storage and the relatively great depth to which its base must be sunk to make it safe.”
The paper also wondered if the two other committee members, Joseph B. Lippincott, who worked intricately with Mulholland on the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and David C. Henny, a native of Holland and resident of Portland, Oregon, who worked as a consultant on federal reclamation projects, would “stand up” to Reagan.
In its issue of 20 April, the Record proclaimed that “another St. Francis dam disaster threatens the people of Los Angeles county if the flood control district’s board of consulting engineers approves the Big Dalton dam,” though, while of a reported smaller impact, “it would destroy hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property and imperil many lives in the area above Glendora.”
Stating that “this conclusion is inevitable from an unbiased investigation of the notorious project foisted upon the people” by Reagan and his push for the bond issue, the paper asserted that “the explorations into the side walls . . . shatter all hope that the dam can be safety build [sic] without the expenditure of around $1,500,000.” This was in addition to the folly of Reagan’s first dam, coming from the bond issue which was “imposed” on voters without property preliminary investigations.
The Record also claimed that the west wall was so unstable that “it is doubtful if it will hold back a pint of water at any point,” so that the section of the dam there “would soon disintegrate under pressure,” while it was further asserted that the abandoned first dam “leaked like a sieve” before it was dynamited. A May 1924 report from a federal reclamation service head, which Reagan reportedly said approved his recommendation leading to the bond vote, actually stated that Big Dalton Canyon was structured so that storage capacity of the reservoir was too small and, therefore, the project was “of little benefit either for flood control or water storage” and that “the investment was of doubtful wisdom for this reason.”
The 24 April edition of the Times reported that Andrew C. Lawson, a geology professor for the University of California, reported positively on the structures of the Pacoima and the Big Dalton sites, stating that, with the latter, “the rock will support the structure with a large margin of safety and there is no occasion to doubt the sufficiency of the foundation.”
The next day’s Record reported on a possible “bitter political war” concerning the 1924 bond issue it said was “put over” on voters, as Reagan and his fellow consultants were said to be advocating for a total reformation of the flood control district as it “is lacking . . . in the essentials of complete co-operation and mutual confidence.” Two of the five supervisors purportedly supported this position, but the majority, it was said, did not.
On the 26th, the Record claimed that “the Big Dalton dam . . . may never be built” as the capacity of water in the reservoir was thought insufficient to spend some $900,000 “to make it safe,” so it was expected the supervisors would vote to terminate the project. With no concrete as yet poured much less bedrock explorations completed and the belief that half the expenditure would have to come from taxes if the dam was built deep enough into the formation to be safe, the committee was quoted as suggesting that leaking around the dam would be enough “to cause apprehension on the part of under-lying residents,” meaning those living below the dam.
The Argus of the 20th, though, quoted Supervisor Jack H. Bean, who the Record stated was against the 1924 bond issue and critical of Reagan, as averring that he and his colleagues did “not intend to abandon the construction of the Big [Dalton] dam, the Pacoima dam or any other dam.” The question instead was getting these built to the highest standards of safety, in light of the St. Francis Dam tragedy, and that any rumors to the contrary were false.
The Times of 8 May reported that, the prior day, the Supervisors voted 4-1 to continue with work on the Big Dalton Dam, with Graves the only naysayer, though it was stated that there were open questions on how to pay for the ballooning costs. Henny and Lippincott reported that the cost would be just a bit above a million dollars and would be safe, but “said that they doubted the results would be worth the investment.”
Reagan, submitting his own report, claimed the cost would be $936,000 “and that it was certainly worth it.” Even that lower figure meant that more than a half million dollars would have to come from somewhere, but it was also stated that Eaton believed the dam could be built for $750,000. As for Bean, he told the press that, while $300,000 was available from funds secured by the State of California, he would not support any allocations beyond that level. When Graves protested that the dam would cost more, Bean merely rejoined, “that’s all right, when it’s gone they can stop building the dam as far as I’m concerned.”
On 21 July 1928, the first pour of concrete was made at the dam site. In October, two men died in a landslide while they operated a steam shovel on a service road and the Argus of the 12th added that “the accident climaxed a series of accidents” and that “several men have been seriously injured” within the past two weeks. On 29 January 1929, another slide took place as a portion of hill was being removed, though there were no injuries and there was time to remove equipment. A two-week delay in construction did ensue.
Moreover, it was reported in the 3 April 1929 edition of the Record that Eaton decided to add “a new gravity section to tie the dam into the mountain on its east end” and matching one already built on the opposite end and that this would increase the cost of the dam, previously stated to be $1 million (a far cry from Reagan’s original $550,000 estimate), to $1.2 million. The Times of the same day observed that other issues included piers not lying on sound rock bed, more excavations and concrete pouring on the mountain sides and more.
Finally, the 7 August edition of the Times noted that the dam was to be completed in a few days and the construction was considered record-breaking in terms of time, while it was considered only the second of its kind ever built. Viewed as primarily for flood control with impounding of water considered secondary, the dam was finished at a stated cost of $1.25 million, well exceeding Lippincott and Heeny’s estimate and far eclipsing Eaton’s amount.
A little more than two weeks later, the county officially accepted the finished product, though the Times had a much lower construction total of $931,000 assigned to it. Eaton’s article in the Engineering News-Record did not provide a cost and, while it focused heavily on technical aspects for the reader of the trade publication, he did briefly mention that the first dam was stopped because “the rockfill material developed was disappointing as to quality” because half the quarry product was not sufficient, while costs for material that was used jumped dramatically and “abutment conditions [that] would be excessive caused abandonment.”
Eaton did write that the rockfill dam “will be used to provide a stilling pool for the spillway and pipe outlets. A good deal of attention was paid to the handling of stresses and load capacity, specifically through the heavy use of reinforcing steel, of contraction joints on the double wall buttresses at each of the half-dozen arches, and gravity abutments at each arch end among other methods. At the foundations, trenches of up to 30 feet were dug with grout and concrete used.
The aggregate for the dam was “carefully proportioned to provide maximum density, strength and workability” while an usual spillway was built in the top 8 feet of a side arch and a reinforced concrete tube running down between buttresses, with discharge “quieted” in the aforementioned stilling pool. Three four-foot diameter steel pipes provided outlets at varied locations, with the two highest for flood control and the lower one for release of water under flooding situations. A sluiceway of 30-inch pipe was placed under the lowest outlet “to keep the level of the debris below the needle valve” of that outlet.
Despite the Record‘s dire warnings, no disasters have occurred at Big Dalton in its 95 years of operation. There were, however, significant issues with corruption involving the San Gabriel Dam and Supervisor Graves ended up being convicted of bribery charges for receiving $80,000 from a contractor who received ten times that much for equipment lost in a landslide. After serving three years at San Quentin State Prison, he was sent up on tax evasion on that bribery money and went to the federal penitentiary at Terminal Island for another two years.
This article is highly technical and sanguine as to its references to the troubles encountered in the early years of the Big Dalton project, but the context of the struggle to get the dam built is a notable one. This is especially so given the broader aspect of the many elements of the flood control system enacted by the county a century or so ago, not to mention the corruption involved—and there was plenty of that in greater Los Angeles during the era!